This essay proclaims that comprehension of mechanisms which generate knowledge on reality are basically linked to comprehension of social environment. We can say that the reality of the world is autological, that generates its own logic.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Advances in Peircean Mathematics: The Colombian School ed. by Fernando ZalameaGianluca CaterinaFernando Zalamea (Ed.) Advances in Peircean Mathematics: The Colombian School Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2022. 212 pp. (incl. index).The volume Advances in Peircean Mathematics is an important, very much needed contribution towards a deeper understanding of the impact of Peirce's work especially in the fields of mathematics, logic, and semiotic. It fills a gap in the (...) current literature by recasting some of [End Page 373] Peirce's profound mathematical insights into a formal framework. This is a finely edited editorial project, which summarizes the work of more than two decades done by a group of scholars—the Colombian School—lead by Fernando Zalamea, a pioneer of Peirce studies, and pragmatism in general, in Latin America.The structure of the volume unfolds in three dense chapters, each corresponding to a specific mathematical context connected to various aspects of Peirce's work. Broadly speaking, in the first chapter, Gustavo Arengas proposes the theory of higher category theory as a natural framework to represent the main traits of Peirce's semiotic; in the second chapter, Francisco Vargas develops a thorough set-theoretical model of Peirce's continuum; in the third chapter, Arnold Oostra, in a truly Peircean spirit, formalizes the notion of Intuitionistic Existential Graphs, emphasizing the idea that intuitionistic logic is the most natural context to represent and understand Peirce's diagrammatic logic. The fourth and last chapter, penned by Zalamea, provides the reader with a solid summary of the main results presented in the volume along with a robust road map to navigate through the technical details of the text.Mathematics, as implied by the title of the volume, is at the core of this project, and the authors do not shy away from the complexity, details, and depth of it in order to shed light on some of the most fundamental and groundbreaking nature of Peirce's ideas. That level of rigor and formal soundness is certainly one of the strengths of the volume, although readers who may not be acquainted with at least some basic notions of category theory or with the mathematics of Peirce's work, may find some of the text a bit terse—this is not a casual reading and it does require a certain level of commitment in order to appreciate the depth of the provided insights. On the other hand, all the background material is clearly laid out, making the volume a self-contained work which can be thoroughly enjoyed by a general audience.The real upshot of recasting some of Peirce's intuitions within the fabric of formal mathematics is not only that of providing the instruments to clarify those ideas, but also that of highlighting the role that Peirce's work has been playing in the development of modern mathematics in many relevant aspects, from the very genesis of category theory—which today is widely regarded as a necessary and unifying language in several fields of the mathematical and physical sciences—to the development of non-standard analysis, just to mention a few of them.An elegant instance of such perspective is offered by Gustavo Arengas in the first chapter, where it is argued that ∞-categories can be used to model the natural order of hierarchies implicit in Peirce's conception of the basic triadic relation between sign, object, and interpreter. What, at first glance, may seem just a simple analogy, unfolds onto a methodical and enlightening analysis of Peirce's semiotic, as the author builds [End Page 374] the connections with the relevant categorical constructions in a precise manner. Most of the rest of the chapter focuses on Peirce's notions of the pragmatic and pragmaticist maxim, and the use of basic structures such as monads, limits, presheaves and sheaves as the natural environment to better convey their meaning, both from a mathematical and a philosophical perspective. The reader will find it interesting to realize that, by delving deeper into the understanding of the relational nature of category theory, a great chunk of Peirce's work can be seen as fundamentally intertwined with the apparatus and the language of modern mathematics... (shrink)

I argue that a certain type of naturalist should not accept a prominent version of the no-miracles argument (NMA). First, scientists (usually) do not accept explanations whose explanans-statements neither generate novel predictions nor unify apparently disparate established claims. Second, scientific realism (as it appears in the NMA) is an explanans that makes no new predictions and fails to unify disparate established claims. Third, many proponents of the NMA explicitly adopt a naturalism that forbids philosophy of science from using any methods (...) not employed by science itself. Therefore, such naturalistic philosophers of science should not accept the version of scientific realism that appears in the NMA. (shrink)

I provide an account of the cognitive attitude of trust that explains the role trust plays in the planning of rational agents. Many authors have dismissed choosing to trust as either impossible or irrational; however, this fails to account for the role of trust in practical reasoning. A can have therapeutic, coping, or corrective reasons to trust B to ${\phi}$ , even in the absence of evidence that B will ${\phi}$ . One can choose to engage in therapeutic trust to (...) inspire trustworthiness, coping trust to simplify one’s planning, or corrective trust to avoid doing a testimonial injustice. To accommodate such types of trust, without accepting doxastic voluntarism, requires an account of the cognitive attitude of trust broader than belief alone. I argue that trust involves taking the proposition that someone will do something as a premise in one’s practical reasoning, which can be a matter of believing or accepting the proposition. I defend this account against objections that it (i) provides insufficient rational constraints on trust, (ii) conflates trust and pretense of trust, and (iii) cannot account for the rationality of back-up planning. (shrink)

Since anonymous agents can spread misinformation with impunity, many people advocate for greater accountability for internet speech. This paper provides a veritistic argument that accountability mechanisms can cause significant epistemic problems for internet encyclopedias and social media communities. I show that accountability mechanisms can undermine both the dissemination of true beliefs and the detection of error. Drawing on social psychology and behavioral economics, I suggest alternative mechanisms for increasing the trustworthiness of internet communication.

Ignorance of one’s privileges and prejudices is an epistemic problem. While the sources of ignorance of privilege and prejudice are increasingly understood, less clarity exists about how to remedy ignorance. In fact, the various causes of ignorance can seem so powerful, various, and mutually reinforcing that studying the epistemology of ignorance can inspire pessimism about combatting socially constructed ignorance. I argue that this pessimism is unwarranted. The testimony of members of oppressed groups can often help members of privileged groups overcome (...) their ignorance. This paper argues that a particular type of speaker’s trust—hopeful trust—can motivate hearers to become cognizant of their privilege and prejudice. I argue that hopeful trust is a powerful way of eliciting trust-responsiveness that can be an effective mechanism for challenging privilege and prejudice. To make this case, I draw on case studies of online attempts to challenge ignorance. While the problems of testimonial injustice, defensi... (shrink)

En el marco del V Congreso Internacional «La actualidad de Michel Foucault» celebrado en la Universidad Complutense de Madrid entre el 6 y el 8 de marzo de 2018, sostuvimos una interesante conversación con Daniel Lorenzini, investigador del pensamiento ético y político de Michel Foucault y editor de varios de sus cursos y conferencias publicadas en los últimos años en Francia. Discutimos sobre el estado actual de los archivos de Foucault adquiridos por la Biblioteca Nacional de Francia (BnF), algunos de (...) los diversos proyectos editoriales que se derivan del trabajo de archivo y análisis de los manuscritos del filósofo, la reciente e inesperada publicación de Les aveux de la chair y su relación con el proyecto de la Historia de la sexualidad tal como fue planteado en 1976, la relación de Foucault con Nietzsche respecto a sus lecturas de la subjetivación y el vínculo, no siempre evidente, entre ética y política a la luz de sus investigaciones sobre el filósofo francés. (shrink)

The underdetermination of theory by data obtains when, inescapably, evidence is insufficient to allow scientists to decide responsibly between rival theories. One response to would-be underdetermination is to deny that the rival theories are distinct theories at all, insisting instead that they are just different formulations of the same underlying theory; we call this the identical rivals response. An argument adapted from John Norton suggests that the response is presumptively always appropriate, while another from Larry Laudan and Jarrett Leplin suggests (...) that the response is never appropriate. Arguments from Einstein for the special and general theories of relativity may fruitfully be seen as instances of the identical rivals response; since Einstein’s arguments are generally accepted, the response is at least sometimes appropriate. But when is it appropriate? We attempt to steer a middle course between Norton’s view and that of Laudan and Leplin: the identical rivals response is appropriate when there is good reason for adopting a parsimonious ontology. Although in simple cases the identical rivals response need not involve any ontological difference between the theories, in actual scientific cases it typically requires treating apparent posits of the various theories as mere verbal ornaments or computational conveniences. Since these would-be posits are not now detectable, there is no perfectly reliable way to decide whether we should eliminate them or not. As such, there is no rule for deciding whether the identical rivals response is appropriate or not. Nevertheless, there are considerations that suggest for and against the response; we conclude by suggesting two of them. (shrink)

We shall try to defend two non-standard views that run counter to two well-entrenched familiar views. The standard views are the universal and existential quantifiers of first-order logic are not modal operators, and the quantifiers are extensional. If that is correct then the counterclaims create genuine problems for some traditional philosophical doctrines.

We discuss in this paper the scope of abduction in Economics. The literature on this type of inference shows that it can be interpreted in different ways, according to the role and nature of its outcome. We present a formal model that allows to capture these various meanings in different economic contexts.

Many commentators on Alfred Tarski have, following Hartry Field, claimed that Tarski's truth-definition was motivated by physicalism—the doctrine that all facts, including semantic facts, must be reducible to physical facts. I claim, instead, that Tarski did not aim to reduce semantic facts to physical ones. Thus, Field's criticism that Tarski's truth-definition fails to fulfill physicalist ambitions does not reveal Tarski to be inconsistent, since Tarski's goal is not to vindicate physicalism. I argue that Tarski's only published remarks that speak approvingly (...) of physicalism were written in unusual circumstances: Tarski was likely attempting to appease an audience of physicalists that he viewed as hostile to his ideas. In later sections I develop positive accounts of: (1) Tarski's reduction of semantic concepts; (2) Tarski's motivation to develop formal semantics in the particular way he does; and (3) the role physicalism plays in Tarski's thought. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 107 Heft: 3 Seiten: 485-495.

Many have tackled the question ‘What (if anything) is analytic philosophy?’ I will not attempt to answer this vexed question. Rather, I address a smaller, more manageable set of interrelated questions: first, when and how did people begin using the label ‘analytic philosophy’? Second, how did those who used this label understand it? Third, why did many philosophers we today classify as analytic initially resist being grouped together under the single category of ‘analytic philosophy’? Finally, for the first generation who (...) described themselves as analytic philosophers, what was their intended contrast class? Relatedly, when did ‘continental philosophy’ become the standard opposition? Some evidence I present justifies received answers to these questions; other evidence supports surprising and unorthodox answers to these questions. (shrink)

Un análisis de la noción de filosofía en Heidegger y en Deleuze nos permite comprobar cómo ambos se ven llevados a un planteamiento estético, a una concepción poética del lenguaje o de la creatividad, para caracterizar a la filosofía misma. La distancia entre ambos reside, no obstante, en la insatisfacción que inevitablemente sufren las esperanzas de Heidegger al depositarlas en lo poético, mientras que Deleuze equipara el quehacer filosófico y el estético al consistir ambos en producción de sentido. An analysis (...) of the notion of philosophy in Heidegger and Deleuze allows us to verify how both are taken to an aesthetic exposition, to a poetic conception of the language or the creativity, in order to characterize to the philosophy. The distance between both resides, however, in the dissatisfaction which inevitably they undergo the hopes of Heidegger when depositing them in the poetic thing, whereas Deleuze compares the philosophical task and aesthetic when consisting the both of sense production. (shrink)

The logic of singular terms that refer to nothing, such as ‘Santa Claus,’ has been studied extensively under the heading of free logic. The present essay examines expressions whose reference is defective in a different way: they signify more than one entity. The bulk of the effort aims to develop an acceptable formal semantics based upon an intuitive idea introduced informally by Hartry Field and discussed by Joseph Camp; the basic strategy is to use supervaluations. This idea, as it stands, (...) encounters difficulties, but with suitable refinements it can be salvaged. Two other options for a formal semantics of multiply signifying terms are also presented, and I discuss the relative merits of the three semantics briefly. Finally, possible modifications to the standard logical regimentation of the notion of existence are considered. (shrink)

We present a category-theoretical analysis, based on the concept of generic figures, of a diagrammatic system for propositional logic (Peirce’s Existential Graphs α\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\alpha $$\end{document}). The straightforward construction of a presheaf category EGα∗\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\mathcal {E}}}{{\mathcal {G}}}_{\alpha ^{*}}$$\end{document} of cuts-only Existential Graphs (equivalent to the well-studied category of finite forests) provides a basis for the further construction of the category EGα\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} (...) \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\mathcal {E}}}{{\mathcal {G}}}_\alpha $$\end{document} which introduces variables in a reconstructedly generic, or label-free, mode. Morphisms in these categories represent syntactical embeddings or, equivalently but dually, extensions. Through the example of Peirce’s system, it is shown how the generic figures approach facilitates the formal investigation of relations between syntax and semantics in such diagrammatic systems. (shrink)

RESUMEN En el prólogo a la segunda edición de la Crítica de la razón pura, ¿qué ha querido decir Kant con una “revolución del modo de pensar” que se debe aplicar a la metafísica para que tome el camino de la ciencia? Cabe distinguir dos significados: uno de carácter metodológico, que asume que el conocimiento rige a los objetos y tendría alcance. Aplicada a la metafísica, supone una transformación más profunda que permite hablar, en segundo lugar, de un significado metafísico (...) específico, que implica que el conocimiento constituye aquello mismo a lo que se llama el objeto de las representaciones. ABSTRACT What is Kant referring to when, in the Preface to the Second Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, he speaks of the “revolution in the way of thinking” that is needed for metaphysics to enter the path of science? Two meanings are possible. The first is a methodological one, which assumes that knowledge governs objects and would, therefore, extend to metaphysics. Applied to the latter, a more profound transformation is needed, one that would make it possible to speak of a specific metaphysical meaning entailing that knowledge constitutes the object of representations. (shrink)

En el prólogo a la segunda edición de la Crítica de la razón pura, ¿qué ha querido decir Kant con una “revolución del modo de pensar” que se debe aplicar a la meta-física para que tome el camino de la ciencia? Cabe distinguir dos significados: uno de carácter metodológico, que asume que el conocimiento rige a los objetos y ten-dría alcance. Aplicada a la metafísica, supone una transformación más profunda que permite hablar, en segundo lugar, de un significado metafísico específico, (...) que implica que el conocimiento constituye aquello mismo a lo que se llama el objeto de las representaciones. (shrink)

We present a formal analysis of Douglas Hofstadter’s concept of superrationality. We start by defining superrationally justifiable actions, and study them in symmetric games. We then model the beliefs of the players, in a way that leads them to different choices than the usual assumption of rationality by restricting the range of conceivable choices. These beliefs are captured in the formal notion of type drawn from epistemic game theory. The theory of coalgebras is used to frame type spaces and to (...) account for the existence of some of them. We find conditions that guarantee superrational outcomes. (shrink)

Monograph on the historical evolution of women's rights from 1902 to 1978 - describes various campaigns for achieving civil rights for women, rights for political participation, equal opportunities for the woman worker, etc., and considers the contributions made to the emancipation of women by the international alliance of women (interest group), the League of Nations, the UN (role of UN) and other international organizations, the international women's year, etc. ILO mentioned. Bibliography pp. 312 to 314, chronology of major events and (...) photographs. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 106 Heft: 3 Seiten: 418-429.

Are judgments of praise for moral behavior modulated by knowledge of an agent's past suffering at the hands of others, and if so, in what direction? Drawing on multiple lines of research in experimental social psychology, we identify three hypotheses about the psychology of praise — typecasting, handicapping, and non-historicism — each of which supports a different answer to the question above. Typecasting predicts that information about past suffering will augment perceived patiency and thereby diminish perceived agency, making altruistic actions (...) seem less praiseworthy; handicapping predicts that this information will make altruistic actions seem more effortful, and hence more praiseworthy; and non-historicism predicts that judgments of praise will be insensitive to information about an agent's experiential history. We report the results of two studies suggesting that altruistic behavior tends to attract more praise when the experiential history of the agent involves coping with adversity in childhood rather than enjoying prosperity (Study 1, N = 348, p = .03, d = 0.45; Study 2, N = 400, p = .02, d = 0.39), as well as the results of a third study suggesting that altruistic behavior tends to be evaluated more favorably when the experiential history of the agent includes coping with adversity than in the absence of information about the agent's past experience (N = 226, p = .002). This pattern of results, we argue, is more consistent with handicapping than typecasting or non-historicism. (shrink)

This paper analyses the relatively neglected topic of hierarchy in the philosophical foundation of human rights. It develops a transcendental-discursive approach. This approach develops the idea that all human rights could be derived from a small set of fundamental rights that are interconnected and that incorporate all ulterior possible specific rights. This set is then applied to an analysis of human rights as they have been formulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The claim is that this prior set (...) of transcendental rights is discursively implied whenever we talk about human rights. Thinking about the hierarchy of rights pragmatically means thinking about prioritising their implementation. Some consequences for practical philosophy and politics concerning the role of states, enterprises and world citizenship are then discussed. (shrink)

Im Anhang zum zweiten Teil der Kritik der Urteilskraft, der Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft, setzt sich Kant mit der Frage nach dem Zweck der Schöpfung auseinander. Seine These ist hier eindeutig: „wir [erkennen] nun den Menschen […] als moralisches Wesen für den Zweck der Schöpfung [an…]“. Warum ist jedoch der Mensch als moralisches Wesen für den Zweck der Schöpfung zu halten? Diese Frage ist keineswegs unumstritten und soll in diesem Aufsatz erörtert werden. Um sie zu beantworten, werde ich den Zusammenhang (...) von drei bestehenden Elementen der kantischen Auffassung des Menschen als Zweck der Schöpfung erläutern: Die vernünftige Natur des Menschen, die Freiheit seines Willens, und das Sittengesetz. (shrink)

Originally published in 1937, this book provides a detailed discussion of the nature of Christian faith and belief in its relationship with the concept of redemption.